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Abstract: The internet has become a pervasive and established part of modern life 
and along with it legal frameworks for establishment and enforcement of consumer 
contracts have and continue to develop. Regulation and enforcement of internet contracts 
varies geographically. Generally, there are two primary legal approaches to internet 
contract enforcement: The United States model that relies on basic notice requirements to 
establish and enforce terms; and the European Union model that focuses on fundamental 
fairness in transactions between businesses and consumers. This paper examines common 
issues surrounding internet contracts and their application. The differences in the United 
States and European Union philosophy and approach to internet contracts are illustrated and 
compared. Finally, the potential for development of a unified legal framework for internet 
contracts is considered.                              
1. Introduction 
The internet has become a pervasive and established part of modern life.   People use the internet for 
instant communication, electronic mail, obtaining the news, investing, banking, forming social networks, 
finding romance, and even learning the law through a Virtual Learning Environment.  Yet, while the 
internet itself – the network and technical communication protocols that make it all possible – is based on 
public standards,1 and as such functions as an electronic commons, the services that make the internet 
valuable are provided by private parties – each of whom seeks to deal under its own terms.   
Today, it has become commonplace for most websites and internet services to publish their own terms 
and condition for viewing content or maintaining an account.  Few consumers read these terms and 
conditions.  Yet, these terms and conditions can be contractually binding.  As such, internet contracts are 
formed between parties across geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. 
To date, different jurisdictions have established their own laws and regulations regarding internet 
contracts.  The two primary nexus of legal development have been the United States – where the law has 
developed through litigation and favours freedom of contract – and the European Union – where the law 
has developed through regulation and favours consumer protection.  Of course, as the reach of the 
internet, and the relationships it fosters, flow seamlessly across jurisdictional boundaries, the prospect 
compels examination of the viability of a unified approach to regulation of internet contracts. 
This paper examines common issues surrounding internet contracts and their application.  The 
difference in the United States and European Union philosophy and approach to internet contracts is 
illustrated and compared.  Finally, the potential for development of a unified legal framework for internet 
contracts is considered. 
                                                 
1
 The internet is the outgrowth of ARPANET, a US military program initiated in 1969 to create a resilient and 
dispersed network of computers.  See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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2. What are internet contracts? 
The internet provides the ability for people and organizations around the globe to communicate and 
engage in transactions where, typically, “there is not enough at issue to justify protracted negotiations.”2  
As such, websites on the internet seek to establish the terms of the transactions in which they engage 
through unilateral contracts; these can include, for example, terms of service and end-user software 
licenses.3  
2.1 Terminology of internet contracts 
 
The development of the internet has created new terms for contracts, depending on how and when assent 
to the unilateral contract is manifested by the consumer.  These terms include shrink-wrap, click-wrap and 
browser-wrap.4 
2.1.1   Shrink-wrap agreements 
In a seminal case that upheld the validity of such agreements in the United States, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook5 explained: “The ‘shrink-wrap license’ gets its name from the fact that retail software 
packages are covered in plastic or cellophane ‘shrink-wrap,’ and some vendors . . . have written licenses 
that become effective as soon as the customer tears the wrapping from the package.”6  Under this scheme, 
the consumer is not aware of all of the terms at the time of purchase; however, the decision to keep the 
product after receiving notice of the unilateral terms is held to constitute assent.7 
2.1.2   Click-wrap agreements  
In contrast to the shrink-wrap approach, ‘click-wrap’ refers to a scheme whereby the consumer is shown 
the terms and is required to manifest assent by clicking on a button or link that states ‘I agree.’8  This 
approach is typical with service providers that require establishment of an account. 
2.1.3   Browse-wrap agreements  
Under the browse-wrap scheme, terms of service are located somewhere on a website, and the consumer’s 
use of the website services is construed as assent to a unilateral contract.9  For example, a consumer that 
uses the Google™ website is considered by the firm to have bound themselves to certain contractual 
terms which can be found by navigating two links away from the home page.10  The terms of service 
state:  
Your use of Google’s products, software, services and web sites (referred to collectively 
as the “Services” . . .) is subject to the terms of a legal agreement between you and 
Google. . . . In order to use the Services, you must first agree to the Terms. You may 
not use the Services if you do not accept the Terms.11 
 
                                                 
2
 Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law: Treatise with Forms, 2d Ed (West 2010), Ch 14.02. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Gregory E. Maggs, Regulating Electronic Commerce, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 665, 670 (Fall2002). 
5
 Now Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and professor of law at the 
University of Chicago.  Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=678 (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
6
 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
7
 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
8
 Margaret J. Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125, 1134 (Fall 2000). 
9
 Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price To Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound By Terms Of Use?, 15 Comm. 
L. & Pol'y 405, 406 (Fall 2010). 
10
 See Google Terms of Service, available at http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
11
 Id. at sections 1.1 and 2.1. 
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Lest the consumer be inclined to take the matter of the legal agreement lightly, the firm suggests:  
“Before you continue, you should print off or save a local copy of the Universal Terms for your 
records.”12 
2.2   But does anyone actually read the agreements? 
It is unclear how many Google™ users have actually read and printed off the ‘legal agreement.’   
However, studies suggest that very few, if any, consumers actually read such terms.   
Anecdotal evidence is available from a demonstration by GameStation, a UK company.  On April 1, 
2010, GameStation required consumers seeking to complete a purchase to review and affirmatively 
accept, among its standard terms, an ‘Immortal Soul Clause;’13 consumers who read the agreement would 
notice an opportunity to opt out of the obligation to relinquish their immortal soul, and obtain a £5 GBP 
gift voucher in the process.14  The firm reported that only 12% of clients who consummated a purchase 
opted to save their souls and collect £5.15   
Published studies paint an even bleaker picture.  A 2006 survey of Cornell Law School students found 
that only four percent claimed to read such agreements in conjunction with purchasing products online.16  
A study of the actual internet browsing behaviour of 45,091 households found that “only about 0.1 or 0.2 
percent access a product’s [agreement] for at least one second.”17   
2.3 What do they write when we are not reading? 
Though a contract for a human soul has fetched about $400 on the internet,18 the market and commercial 
value for souls is still limited and undeveloped.19  Thus, with the exception of the 7500 who did,20 most 
internet consumers can probably rest assured that they have not ‘agreed’ to sell their immortal soul to an 
internet company.  In general, companies seek, and are advised to, minimize their potential liability from 
internet operations.21  Suggested terms include: 
 
• Exculpatory clauses that require waivers of liability from “any incidental or consequential 
damages, including lost revenues, lost profits, or lost economic advantage of any sort.”22 
• Disclaimer of warranties for the product or service provided.23 
                                                 
12
 Id. at section 2.4. 
13
 “By placing an order via this web site on the first day of the fourth month of the year 2010 Anno Domini, you 
agree to grant Us a non transferable option to claim, for now and for ever more, your immortal soul. Should We wish 
to exercise this option, you agree to surrender your immortal soul, and any claim you may have on it, within 5 (five) 
working days of receiving written notification from gamesation.co.uk or one of its duly authorised minions. We 
reserve the right to serve such notice in 6 (six) foot high letters of fire, however we can accept no liability for any loss 
or damage caused by such an act. If you a) do not believe you have an immortal soul, b) have already given it to 
another party, or c) do not wish to grant Us such a license, please click the link below to nullify this sub-clause and 
proceed with your transaction.” As reported by: Marc Perton, Read Fine Print Or GameStation May Own Your Soul, 
consumerist.com, (April 16, 2010). 
14
 Marc Perton, Read Fine Print or GameStation May Own Your Soul, consumerist.com, (April 16, 2010), available 
at: http://consumerist.com/2010/04/read-fine-print-or-gamestation-may-own-your-soul.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2011). 
15
 Id. 
16
 Robert Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal 
Implications, in Is Consumer Protection an Anachronism in the Information Economy? (Jane K. Winn, Ed. 2006). 
17
 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler and Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach 
to Standard Form Contracts, available at: http://www.netinst.org/Bakos_Marotta-Wurgler_Trossen_09-04.pdf  (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2010). 
18
 EBay blocks man's attempt to sell soul, USA Today (Feb. 6, 2002), available at: 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-02-09-ebay-soul.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
19
 See Soul-Mart (http://www.soul-mart.com/); WonderClub list of souls available for sale 
(http://www.wonderclub.com/soul/view_users.php).  
20
 Marc Perton, Read Fine Print or GameStation May Own Your Soul, consumerist.com, (April 16, 2010). 
21
 See, e.g., George B. Delta and Jeffrey H. Matsuura, Law of the Internet (Aspen Publishers, 2011), Appendix 14: 
Minimizing Potential Liability from Internet Operations. 
22
 Id. at para 3. 
23
 Id. 
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• Jurisdiction (choice of forum) clauses that would allow the company to transfer disputes to a 
court of the company’s choosing, along with waiver of “any defences based on venue, the 
inconvenience of the forum, the lack of personal jurisdiction, and the adequacy of service of 
process.”24 
• Mandatory arbitration clauses, by which the consumer gives up the rights to sue the company in 
a court of law, to the ability to form a class action, to a public hearing, to a trial by jury and the 
right to appeal.25 
• Clauses that give away various license rights to content that the consumer generates.26 
• Agreement to a ‘privacy policy’ that allows the company to collect, use and share information 
about the consumer with third parties.27 
• Indemnification clauses that would cause the consumer to pay for the legal defines of the 
company should the company be sued by a third party as a result of the consumer’s activity.28 
 
Actual terms often go beyond the suggested norm.  Another common clause allows the company to 
change the terms of the contract at any time without notice.29  Some terms allow companies to collect 
consumer information beyond internet activity; for example, Apple Inc.’s terms allow the firm and its 
affiliates to “collect, use, and share precise location data, including the real-time geographic location of 
your Apple computer or device.”30   
The literal application of such terms, along with the global reach of the internet, produces interesting 
outcomes.  Take, for example, the oddity created by the British Monarchy joining Facebook™:31 
By creating or administering a page on Facebook, the British Monarchy has apparently entered into an 
agreement32 with Facebook Ireland Limited33 to, among other things, “submit to the personal jurisdiction 
of the courts located in Santa Clara County, California”34 for settling any disputes with Facebook.  So, 
while under the laws of the United Kingdom no civil or criminal proceeding could be brought against Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, herself being the Sovereign and the Fount of Justice,35 could she have 
submitted herself to the laws and jurisdiction of the courts of Santa Clara County, California, to 
adjudicate disputes with a corporation chartered in a former province of the British Empire?  If so, such 
an agreement may be of diplomatic and constitutional importance in the United Kingdom. 
3. Are internet contracts enforceable? 
In principle, there is no difference at law between a contract formed in person and one formed on the 
internet.36  At the most basic level, what is required is an offer and an acceptance.37  The question of 
whether the consumer’s explicit or implicit conduct demonstrates assent and the intention to form an 
                                                 
24
 Id. at para 5. 
25
 Id. at para 6. 
26
 Gregory C. Smith, Start-Up and Emerging Companies (American Lawyer Media, 2011), Chapter 26. Legal Issues 
Associated with Creating and Operating Web Sites, para. g. 
27
 Id. at para d. 
28
 Id. at para g. 
29
 See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, para. 19.2, available at: http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS  
30
 Privacy Policy, Apple Inc., available at: http://www.apple.com/privacy/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2011); Indeed, it was 
recently discovered that the firm’s popular iPhone product has been collecting the movement and location of 
consumers without their knowledge. See Christopher Williams, Apple iPhone tracks users' location in hidden file, 
The Telegraph (Apr. 20, 2011), available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/8464122/Apple-iPhone-
tracks-users-location-in-hidden-file.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
31
 Queen to launch British Monarchy page on Facebook, BBC News UK (Nov. 7, 2010), available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11704599 (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
32
 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook, section 12. Available at: http://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
33
 Id. at section 18.1. 
34
 Id. at section 15.1. 
35
 See The Queen as Fount of Justice, available at 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/Queenandthelaw/SovereignasFountofJustice.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
36
 Ian C. Ballon, Internet Terms of Use and Contract Formation, 978 PLI/Pat 625, 628 (September 2009). 
37
 Id. 
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agreement has been the subject of debate and litigation.38  However, once a party manifests an 
intention39 to accept the terms put forth by another, an agreement can be formed.   
Beyond the assent of the consumer, whether the terms of the agreement are enforceable largely 
depends on regulations, consumer protection laws, and equitable considerations, such as the doctrine of 
unconscionability.40  Thus, the regional variance in laws, regulations and procedure causes a dilemma.  
While the internet makes geographic and jurisdictional boundaries irrelevant for the purpose of 
exchanging information and service, the legal framework governing terms and enforceability of 
agreements are jurisdictionally dependant.  Thus, Google and Facebook may present the same service and 
same terms to everyone around the globe, and consumers may ‘agree’, but applicability and enforcement 
of the terms will vary depending on the location. 
3.1   A cautionary tale 
Feldman v. Google (2007)41 provides a clear illustration of why unread internet contract terms matter and 
how terms that would not be enforceable in the European Union are readily enforced in the United States.  
Lawrence Feldman, an attorney with a solo practice in Elkins Park, Pennsylvania, had signed up to 
advertise his services through Google’s AdWords program.42 This “pay per click” program presented an 
advertisement to users of Google who searched for specific terms and charged Feldman when the users 
clicked on his advertisement.43  Feldman allegedly became a victim of click fraud.44 
 
Click fraud occurs when entities or persons, such as competitors or pranksters, without 
any interest in Plaintiff's services, click repeatedly on Plaintiff's ad, the result of which 
drives up his advertising cost and discourages him from advertising.45 
 
Google’s charges to Feldman exceeded $100,000.46  Feldman brought suit in the Common Pleas 
Court of Philadelphia County, alleging that click fraud can be tracked and prevented by computer 
programs, and that Google was negligent in failing to prevent and in not adequately warning him or 
investigating his complaints about click fraud.47  Feldman sought “disgorgement of any profits [Google] 
obtained as a result of any unlawful conduct, and restitution of money [Feldman had] paid for fraudulent 
clicks.”48 
Google successfully removed the matter to the federal court for Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 
in the instant forum sought dismissal of the action, or in the alternative, transfer to the Northern District 
of California, located in Santa Clara County, California pursuant to the terms of its click-wrap 
agreement.49  Feldman argued that the online agreement was not a valid contract, that he did not have 
notice and did not assent to the terms.50  However, the court found the contract to be binding and that 
“failure to read an enforceable click-wrap agreement, as with any binding contract, will not excuse 
compliance with its terms.”51  “A reasonably prudent internet user would have known of the existence of 
                                                 
38
 Id. 
39
 It is important to note that while a signature can be used to evidence to show an intention to be bound, it is not 
required to form a contract.  Regardless, both the European Union and the United States have enacted legislation to 
give full legal effect to ‘electronic signatures.’  See Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures; Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. 96; see also see, Dennis Campbell, E-Commerce and the Law of Digital 
Signatures, (Oceana Publications, Inc, 2005). 
40
 Nicola Lucchi, The Supremacy of Techno-Governance: Privatization of Digital Content and Consumer Protection 
in the Globalized Information Society, 15 INTJLIT 192 (Summer 2007). 
41
 Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 229 (E.D.Pa., 2007). 
42
 Id. at 232. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. at 233. 
48
 Id. at 232. 
49
 Id. at 233. 
50
 Id. at 235. 
51
 Id. at 236. 
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terms. . . Plaintiff's failure to read the Agreement, if that were the case, does not excuse him from being 
bound by his express agreement.”52 
Feldman argued that transfer of the case to the federal court in Santa Clara (2914 mi / 4689 km away 
from his home jurisdiction)53 would be tantamount to denying him access to the court.  Feldman also 
argued that other provisions of the Google agreement were unconscionable, including provisions that: 
 
• Disclaim all warranties, including “merchantability and fitness for any purpose.”54 
• Exempt Google from any liability “for any consequential, special, indirect, exemplary, punitive, 
or other damages whether in contract, tort or any other legal theory, even if advised of the 
possibility of such damages.”55 
• Shorten the statute of limitations for disputing charges to sixty days.56 
 
The court rejected Feldman’s arguments, upheld the agreement, and transferred the case to the federal 
court located in Santa Clara County.57  The case was never heard by the court in California as Feldman 
settled the matter.58  This was likely a wise move; the finding that the click-wrap agreement, along with 
provisions regarding warranty and liability, was enforceable would likely make a trial moot. 
This case was presided over by Judge James Giles59, educated at Yale Law School, former attorney 
for the National Labor Relations Board, and appointed by President Carter to a life-time appointment as a 
federal judge.   According to Westlaw Judicial Reports, in the last five years, of 82 appeals of his 
decisions, only two were reversed and two were reversed in part.  This suggests that such treatment of 
internet contracts by United States federal courts is neither unusual nor uncharacteristic.  This outcome 
would be unlikely in the European Union. 
4. To litigate or to regulate, that is the question 
Consumers and internet businesses face significantly different laws and enforcement procedures across 
the Atlantic.60  Unique among other jurisdictions, the United States follows a market-oriented approach 
that shifts costs and risks to the consumer; while the European Union, along with many other 
jurisdictions, has developed a regulatory regime to protect consumers from risk.61  Other jurisdictions 
that follow a consumer oriented regulatory model similar to that of the European Union include 
Australia,62 Canada,63 Japan,64 New Zealand,65 and Singapore.66 
                                                 
52
 Id. at 238. 
53
 As computed to be the shortest distance by Google Maps™. 
54
 Id. at 242. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. at 249. 
58
 Confirmed by e-mail correspondence with Lawrence Feldman on Apr 6, 2011.  On record with author. 
59
 Official judicial profile, available at: http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=857 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) 
60
 Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 175 (2006). 
61
 See Ragnar E. Lofstedt & David Vogel, The Changing Character of Regulation: A Comparison of Europe and the 
United States, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 399 (2001). 
62
 See, Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Legislation, available at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/3653 (last visited Apr 7, 2011). 
63
 See Industry Canada, Internet Sales Contract Harmonization Template (2001), available  at  
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/vwapj/Sales_Template.pdf/$FILE/Sales_Template.pdf (last visited Apr 6, 
2011) 
64
 See Antonios Karaiskos, Regulation of Unfair Contract Terms in Japan, Waseda bulletin of comparative law (28), 
13-44, 2010-03-01 (Outlining the influence of EU regulations on development of Japanese legislation); Quality-of-
Life Policy Bureau, Consumer Policy Regime in Japan, available at 
http://www.consumer.go.jp/english/cprj/index.html (last visited Apr 7, 2011) (Noting that “The [Consumer Contract] 
Act includes a rule to enable consumers to cancel contracts when they misunderstand or are confused about certain 
activities by business enterprises and a rule to enable consumers to nullify all or part of provisions of contracts that 
unfairly impair the interests of consumers.”). 
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In the United States, both dispute resolution and legal development has relied predominately on 
litigation.  Within this context, the most litigated issues have generally revolved around procedurally 
oriented contract terms used by internet companies to limit consumer access to the courts and judicial 
process – such as terms requiring binding arbitration, limiting forum selection, and waiving class action 
rights.67 
In contrast, the Council of the European Union Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts,68 and 
its implementation in Member States, has eviscerated some of the terms commonly used in the United 
States by directing that they not be binding on consumers.69  For example, the Directive prohibits terms 
aimed at: 
 
• “Excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action; restricting the evidence 
available or imposing a burden of proof.”70   
• “Irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming 
acquainted.”71   
• “Unilateral alteration of the terms of the contract.”72 
• Choice of law provisions that would apply to deny the consumer protections granted by the 
Directive.73 
 
Perhaps more importantly, the Directive requires Member States to ensure that “adequate and 
effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms”74 and that “persons or organizations, 
having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers, may take action . . . before the 
courts.”75  As such, individual consumers are not necessarily required to file actions or join in a class, but 
rather, consumer groups can move on their behalf and seek legal remedies “directed separately or jointly 
against a number of sellers or suppliers from the same economic sector or their associations which use or 
recommend the use of the same general contractual terms or similar terms.”76  Meanwhile, agencies such 
as the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading77 can enforce and prosecute, but also provide guidance to 
businesses on how to comply with consumer protection laws.78   
4.1 Internet contract law in the United States 
In describing the state of internet law in the United States, Professor Mark Lemley79 wrote in 2006: 
                                                                                                                                               
65
 See Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, Part 4, Supply of services, available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0091/latest/DLM311053.html (last visited Apr 7, 2011); Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs, Consumer Law Reform Additional Paper – Unfair Contract Terms (September 2010), available at 
http://www.consumeraffairs.govt.nz/pdf-library/legislation-policy-pdfs/CLR-Additional-paper---Unfair-contract-
terms.pdf (last visited Apr 7, 2011); Ministry of Consumer Affairs, New Zealand Model Code for Consumer 
Protection in Electronic Commerce (October 2000), available at http://www.consumeraffairs.govt.nz/pdf-
library/publications/model_code_e_commerce.pdf (last visited Apr 7, 2011).  
66
 See Unfair Contract Terms Act, (Chapter 396) (1994), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (last visited Apr 7, 
2010). 
67
 See Wayne Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of 
Restatement Section 211(3), 82 Wash. L. Rev. 227 (2007). 
68
 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013:EN:NOT (last visited Apr 7, 2011). 
69
 Id. at Article 6.1 
70
 Id. at ANNEX No 1q 
71
 Id. at ANNEX No 1i 
72
 Id. at ANNEX No 1j 
73
 Id. at Article 6.2 
74
 Id. at Article 7.1 
75
 Id. at Article 7.2 
76
 Id. at Article 7.3 
77
 Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) is a government agency charged with “making sure markets work well for 
consumers.” OFT—About the Office of Fair Trading, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/About/default.htm (last 
visited Apr 4, 2011). 
78
 See Office of Fair Trading, Unfair contract terms guidance: Guidance for the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (September 2008), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/unfair_contract_terms/oft311.pdf (last visited Apr 7, 2011). 
79
 Professor of Law at Stanford Law School and Director, Stanford Program in Law, Science & Technology. Profile 
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/profile/38/ (last visited Apr 8, 2011). 
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Ten years ago, courts required affirmative evidence of agreement to form a contract. No 
court had enforced a “shrink-wrap” license, much less treated a unilateral statement of 
preferences as a binding agreement. Today, by contrast, more and more courts and 
commentators seem willing to accept the idea that if a business writes a document and 
calls it a contract, courts will enforce it as a contract even if no one agrees to it. Every 
court to consider the issue has found “clickwrap” licenses, in which an online user 
clicks “I agree” to standard form terms, enforceable.80 
4.1.1   How the law developed 
The seminal event in the development of United States jurisprudence was Judge Easterbrook’s81 decision 
in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (1996).82  In ProCD,83 the company had sold a phone database in a box 
that included terms of the license inside.84  Judge Easterbrook held that the terms included in the box, 
even though unseen at the time of purchase, were enforceable because Zeidenberg knew they were there 
and could return the product if he did not like the terms; keeping the product constituted assent to the 
unilateral terms.85  “A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose 
limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts 
the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance. And that is what happened.”86  Judge Easterbrook noted that 
the state can forbid the use of standard contracts, but defended the use of standard contracts as “essential 
to a system of mass production and distribution.”87 
A year later, Judge Easterbrook followed ProCD with a decision that upheld a binding arbitration 
clause88 included in the standard terms.  Hill v. Gateway 2000 (1997)89 was a class action by consumers 
who had purchased computers by telephone; the computers arrived in boxes containing a form contract 
that required arbitration of all disputes.90  The trial court had invalidated the arbitration clause for lack of 
notice.91  On appeal, following the rationale in ProCD, Judge Easterbrook held that both the contract and 
the arbitration terms were enforceable.  The decision was noteworthy in that it held consumers to the 
same standard applied to the merchant plaintiff in ProCD, and also in that it justified the policy on 
economic grounds.  In addressing this, Judge Easterbrook writes: “Customers as a group are better off 
when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple 
approve-or-return device. Competent adults are bound by such documents, read or unread.”92   
By the late 1990’s, court decisions enforcing internet terms of service began to appear.  In Hotmail 
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc. (1998),93 the court issued an injunction against users for violating 
                                                 
80
 Mark A. Lemley, Terms Of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 459 (December 2006). 
81
 Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, one of the most cited appellate judges in 
the United States, a proponent of use of economic principles in law.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_H._Easterbrook (last visited Apr 8, 2011). 
82
 Mark A. Lemley, Terms Of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 468 (December 2006). 
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Hotmail’s terms of service by using the accounts to send spam.94  In Caspi v. Microsoft Network (1999),95 
the New Jersey court of appeal upheld Microsoft’s choice of forum clause because the users manifested 
consent by clicking the ‘I agree’ button during registration.  The court stated:   “Plaintiffs must be taken 
to have known that they were entering into a contract; and no good purpose, consonant with the dictates 
of reasonable reliability in commerce, would be served by permitting them to disavow particular 
provisions or the contracts as a whole.”96 
In the United States, the issue of enforceability often turns on proper notice and the act by which it is 
claimed that the consumer manifested assent.  In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. (2002),97 a 
class of consumers brought suit against Netscape alleging that the firm’s program invaded their privacy 
by transmitting their internet behavior and personal information to Netscape.98  The firm contended that, 
by downloading the software, the consumers had agreed to the terms of its license and were bound by 
mandatory arbitration terms.  The firm contended that it gave sufficient notice of the terms by providing 
the following notice next to the download button: “Please review and agree to the terms . . . before 
downloading and using the software.”99  In an opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor,100 the court of 
appeals addressed “issues of contract formation in cyberspace,”101 considered decisions of ProCD and 
Hill, and held that the simple act of downloading is not enough to show assent.  “Reasonably conspicuous 
notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by 
consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.”102  In short, the 
consumer should be shown the agreement and required to click ‘I agree.’ 
Yet, the same court clarified in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. (2004), “contract offers on the 
Internet often require the offeree to click on an ‘I agree’ icon. And no doubt, in many circumstances, 
[this] is essential to the formation of a contract. But not in all circumstances.”103 When the consumer 
“makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an 
acceptance of the terms.”104  Thus, when the consumer has knowledge that the terms exist, they can be 
binding even if he has not manifested assent by clicking on a button marked ‘I agree.’ 
4.1.2   The turning tide in State courts 
More recently, courts have relied on State consumer protection statutes to invalidate specific terms in 
internet contracts, particularly with those relating to arbitration and choice of forum.105  The move for 
reform has come from State courts, notably from California, where the law relative to unconscionability 
gives greater flexibility to judges to reform contracts for reasons of equity, fairness or public policy.106 
In California, legislation provides the courts with authority to refuse enforcement of any contract term 
that is found “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,”107 and further requires that claimants 
“shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence” to the courts to show that a contract or a 
clause is unconscionable.108  To determine if a contract term is unconscionable, California courts conduct 
a two-step analysis and require the term to be both procedurally and substantially unconscionable, “the 
former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly 
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harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”109  The California courts have applied this analysis, along with policies 
embodied in the State’s consumer protection acts, to terms commonly found in internet contracts. 
In America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001), the California court of appeals refused to enforce 
America Online’s forum selection clause.110  In that case, the class action litigants had sought remedies 
under the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA);111 transfer and trial of the case to Virginia 
would have constituted “the functional equivalent of a contractual waiver of the consumer protections 
under the CLRA.”112  The court found that doing so would diminish the rights of California residents and 
violate public policy.113 
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005), 114 the Supreme Court of California found that 
unconscionability analysis was applicable to mandatory arbitration provisions – the very type of clause 
that was at issue in ProCD.  In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court was confronted with the 
task of balancing California’s policy favoring fairness in consumer contracts, with the federal policy 
favouring arbitration agreements as embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).115  The FAA 
requires that a “written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”116  As such, the California Supreme Court found that in enforcing arbitration agreements, 
California courts are permitted to employ the same standards that they would to any other contract.117  If 
the terms of an arbitration agreement – such as the class action waiver at issue in the instant case – are 
found to be unconscionable, then enforcement of those terms or the entire contract can be denied in the 
same manner as any other contract; thus, state courts are not obligated by the FAA to “enforce contractual 
terms even if those terms are found to be unconscionable or contrary to public policy under general 
contract law principles.”118  The California Supreme Court clarified: 
 
We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessarily unconscionable.  But when 
the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes 
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and 
when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small 
sums of money, then, at least to the extent the obligation at issue is governed by 
California law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from 
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or wilful injury to the person or property of 
another.”119 
 
On this basis, the court held that the arbitration agreement at issue was unconscionable.  The Discover 
Bank principle decidedly brought internet contract under the purview of California’s unconscionability 
analysis. 
In Aral v. EarthLink, Inc. (2005), the California Court of Appeals invalidated both class action waiver 
and forum selection clauses of EarthLink’s agreement as unconscionable.120  The court derided the “focus 
on notice over reasonableness.”121  The court further clarified that when terms of agreement are presented 
to a consumer on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, the process automatically meets the requirements of 
procedural unconscionability.122  As such, the term that required consumers to travel long distances to 
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collect small sums, on a case-by-case basis, was substantially unconscionable and unreasonable as a 
matter of law.123 
In Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007), the California Court of Appeal invalidated arbitration clause 
contained in T-Mobile’s agreement as unconscionable.124  The court reiterated that “use of a contract of 
adhesion establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the availability of 
market alternatives.”125  Thus, with such contracts, California courts would move to analyse the degree of 
substantive unconscionability.  After the California State Supreme Court denied a petition for review, T-
Mobile, in a direct challenge of the principle set in Discover Bank, sought review with the United States 
Supreme Court, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) precludes state courts from refusing to 
enforce private arbitration agreements regardless of the terms.126  T-Mobile’s petition for review of the 
California Court of Appeal decision by the United States Supreme Court was denied.127  
Beyond California, in Dix v. ICT Group, Inc. (2007), the Supreme Court of Washington State upheld 
an appellate court decision finding that a forum selection clause violated public policy.128  A class of 
consumers had brought action against America Online, Inc. (AOL), and sought remedy under Washington 
State’s Consumer Protection Act, alleging that the firm overcharged them.129  Pursuant to its clickwrap 
agreement, AOL moved to dismiss the case, stating that the forum selection clause mandated that disputes 
be adjudicated in Virginia.130  Acknowledging support for standardized contracts at the federal court 
level, the state court noted: 
 
In general, a forum selection clause may be enforced even if it is in a standard form 
consumer contract not subject to negotiation. [Citing United States Supreme Court 
Authority] “[E]nforcement of forum selection clauses serves the salutary purpose of 
enhancing contractual predictability.” Additionally, such clauses may reduce the costs 
of doing business, thus resulting in reduced prices to consumers.131  
 
However, the court then quoted the United States Supreme Court in noting that such terms should be 
held unenforceable if they would operate to “contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit 
is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”132 The Virginia forum presented greater 
obstacles in forming a class action suit, and thus violated the policy embodied in the State’s Consumer 
Protection Act.133  
 
[P]ublic policy is violated when a citizen's ability to assert a private right of action is 
significantly impaired by a forum selection clause that precludes class actions in 
circumstances where it is otherwise economically unfeasible for individual consumers 
to bring their small-value claims. 134 
 
It is important to note that these developments on the West Coast are not representative of the state of 
law in the remainder of the United States.  New York State courts are much more formalistic in the 
approach to contract terms, and would likely not undertake such analysis.135  Moreover, standards for 
unconscionability vary among the States; for example, in upholding enforceability of an arbitration term, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina defined unconscionability “as the absence of meaningful choice on 
the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with terms that are so oppressive that 
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no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them.”136  Adopting 
the same definition, the Supreme Court of Alabama adds that “rescission of a contract for 
unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy usually reserved for the protection of the unsophisticated 
and uneducated.”137  By these standards, the facts presented in the California State cases would clearly 
not have produced the same results in Alabama and South Carolina. 
4.1.3   The tide breaks on the U.S. Supreme Court shores 
With the California State courts leading the charge, issues of California law eventually found their way 
into the federal courts.  In Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California (2007), the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals considered “whether to enforce a modified contract with a customer where . . . 
the only notice of the changed terms consisted of posting the revised contract on the provider’s 
website.”138  Talk America, Inc. had added new terms to its customer service contract, including an 
arbitration clause, a class action waiver and a choice of law provision.  The district federal court found 
adequate notice to enforce the new terms and compelled arbitration.139  On review, the court of appeals 
found that mere posting of new terms is not adequate notice, and further noted in obiter: “Even if Douglas 
were bound by the new terms of the contract (which he is not . . .), the new terms probably would not be 
enforceable in California because they conflict with California's fundamental policy as to unconscionable 
contracts.”140 
California law set out in Discover Bank also found approval with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. (2007).  As alleged in that case, after the merger of 
AT&T Wireless and Cingular, the company sought to prompt transition of clients from AT&T service 
plans to maximize profits.  To do so, the firm degraded service quality and then informed complaining 
customers that “it could provide members with a ‘chip’ that would restore their service quality. To receive 
the chip, however, [they] would be required to extend their current contracts by entering into ‘Wireless 
Service Agreements’ (Agreements) with Cingular.”141 To enter into the new service agreement, 
customers were required to “select[] the answer ‘Yes’ in response to the statement ‘You agree to the 
terms as stated in the Wireless Service Agreement and terms of service.’”142 The terms of service 
incorporated a mandatory arbitration clause along with a class action waiver.143  In applying California 
law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held: “Cingular’s class arbitration waiver is unconscionable under 
California law, and that refusing to enforce such a provision, as California courts would, is not expressly 
or impliedly pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act.”144 
In an ironic twist, a very similar issue came back before the Ninth Circuit after AT&T acquired 
Cingular and renamed it AT&T Mobility.  In Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC (2009), the firm sought to 
enforce its arbitration terms against consumers who complained that the firm charged them $30 in ‘taxes’ 
for a ‘free’ phone.145  While the specific terms of the arbitration provision was slightly different, the firm 
made the same arguments rejected in Shroyer – namely that allowing consumers to form class-actions 
“would hinder a speedy resolution, place extra burdens on the arbitral process, and lead to companies 
abandoning arbitration altogether.”146  The firm failed on appeal but succeeded in its petition for certiorari 
with the United States Supreme Court.147 
In its decision rendered on April 27, 2011,148 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit decision and, in doing so also eviscerated the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover 
Bank by holding that the FAA pre-empts state law and requires all courts to enforce arbitration clauses in 
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consumer contracts.149  In the opinion penned by Justice Scalia, the majority provides that the States can 
address their concerns with contracts of adhesion by requiring better notice “for example, requiring class-
action-waiver provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be highlighted.”150  Perhaps signalling 
general approval of adhesion contracts as a whole, the Supreme Court also states that “the times in which 
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”151 
It is yet unclear how this ruling will affect the viability of State consumer protection laws and unfair 
contract laws, as it pertains only to the mandatory arbitration clauses.  However, as parties are free to 
establish their own rules and terms of arbitration, and  arbitration agreements are enforceable by their own 
terms, it would seem possible that any term, exclusion, or restriction can be bound under the umbrella of 
an arbitration clause or required terms of arbitration.  Of course, this places the law of United States with 
respect to arbitration clauses in direct conflict with those of the European Union that automatically 
consider arbitration terms to be unfair and nonbinding.152 
4.1.4   Contrast to development of UK unfair contract law 
The current state of the law in the United States relative to internet contracts, where some State courts 
have been using consumer protection laws and principles of unconscionability in the attempt to slowly 
change the formalistic approach of contract enforcement is somewhat similar to how the law developed in 
the United Kingdom.   
Nearly thirty years ago, well before the world-wide-web or prevalent personal use of computers, Lord 
Denning MR, delivered the final judgment of his career in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney 
Lock Seeds Ltd [1983].153  The case dealt with the sale of defective cabbage seeds under a form contract 
that limited liability to the cost of “seeds or plants sold.”  To allow for consequential damages, the Court 
of Appeal held that the product was so defective that it could not have been “seeds,” and thus the standard 
form limitation did not apply.  Lord Denning delivered a concurring opinion, the rationale of which was 
accepted by the House of Lords on review.154  Lord Denning’s dissent is noteworthy in the context of the 
development of United States internet contract law: 
The heyday of freedom of contract 
None of you nowadays will remember the trouble we had - when I was called to the Bar 
- with exemption clauses. They were printed in small print on the back of tickets and 
order forms and invoices. They were contained in catalogues or timetables. They were 
held to be binding on any person who took them without objection. No one ever did 
object. He never read them or knew what was in them. No matter how unreasonable 
they were, he was bound. All this was done in the name of “freedom of contract.” But 
the freedom was all on the side of the big concern which had the use of the printing 
press. No freedom for the little man who took the ticket or order form or invoice. The 
big concern said, “Take it or leave it.” The little man had no option but to take it. The 
big concern could and did exempt itself from liability in its own interest without regard 
to the little man. It got away with it time after time. When the courts said to the big 
concern, “You must put it in clear words,” the big concern had no hesitation in doing 
so. It knew well that the little man would never read the exemption clauses or 
understand them. 
It was a bleak winter for our law of contract. . . . Faced with this abuse of power - by 
the strong against the weak - by the use of the small print of the conditions - the judges 
did what they could to put a curb upon it. They still had before them the idol, “freedom 
of contract.” They still knelt down and worshipped it, but they concealed under their 
cloaks a secret weapon.  They used it to stab the idol in the back. . . . In short, whenever 
the wide words - in their natural meaning - would give rise to an unreasonable result, 
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the judges either rejected them as repugnant to the main purpose of the contract, or else 
cut them down to size in order to produce a reasonable result.155 
 
Lord Denning called for judicial determination as to the reasonableness of standard contract terms 
and reliance on the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977156 to strike offending terms.  In effect, the California 
State courts aimed for the same goal in applying state laws to invalidate terms on the basis of 
unconscionability – they were stabbing at the ‘freedom of contract’ idol.  Of course, the courts in the 
United Kingdom operated in an environment where the Parliament enacted an unfair contract terms Act, 
and where the House of Lords upheld its application. 
The courts in the United States exist in a different environment, one where Congress has established a 
policy favouring private arbitration and the United States Supreme Court has held that the FAA pre-empts 
state laws and requires arbitration provisions to be “enforced according to their terms.”157  Of course, this 
national standard as to applicability of arbitration terms still leaves the States to regulate other terms.  
Whether they will continue the charge against contracts of adhesion remains to be seen.   
One thing that is certain is that on the national level, the philosophy and direction of legal 
development between the United States and the European Union have been and are progressively 
divergent.  The philosophical view point of the United States Supreme Court that adhesive consumer 
contracts are the modern norm of contracting is unlikely to be harmonized with that of the Council of 
European Union’s directive that adhesive contracts should be nonbinding. 
4.2   Internet contract law in the European Union 
In contrast to how internet law has developed in the United States through litigation, the European 
development has been through legislation.  Prior to the Treaty on European Union, each member state had 
its own regulatory model.  The Unfair Contract Terms Act, enacted in the United Kingdom in 1977, 
provides an example of a national law aimed at regulating terms used in standard contracts with 
consumers.158  As one of the stated goals of the European Union was to “promote economic and social 
progress for their peoples . . . and to implement policies ensuring that advances in economic integration 
are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields,”159 the EU began a process of harmonizing 
consumer protection laws soon after the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty.160 
In 1993, the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs developed a directive on unfair 
contract terms in consumer contracts.161  The Distance Selling Directive162 was issued in 1997 to 
regulate transactions completed remotely, including by internet and other electronic means.  The 
Directive on Electronic Commerce163 was issued in 2000 to promote accountability and transparency 
with regard to online transactions.  Implementation of these directives by the Member States has 
developed the framework of internet law in the European Union.  
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4.2.1   Local implementation 
The Maastricht Treaty requires Member States to develop their national law to comply with the terms and 
the requirements of the directives; as such, once the national laws are enacted, the terms of the directive 
establish the minimum protections available to the individuals. In the interim, courts are required to 
interpret national laws in light of the directives.164 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive, which applies to all consumer contracts whether online or 
offline, requires Member States to “ensure that contracts concluded with consumers do not contain unfair 
terms.”165  Specifically relevant to internet contracts, the directive provides: “A contractual term which 
has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if . . . it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”166  In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the directive was first implemented by The Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1994,167 and then as amended by The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999.168  The Acts allow for direct enforcement action by the consumer and also empowers 
the Office of Fair Trading and other regulatory bodies to seek enforcement through the courts.169 
4.2.2   AOL France v UFC Que Choisir 
Application of the European regulations relative to internet contracts is illustrated by the case brought 
forth by Union Federale des Consommateurs-Que Choisir (“UFC Que Choisir”)170 against AOL 
France.171  The case illuminates both the European Union regulatory model and its enforcement 
mechanism. 
La Commission Des Clauses Abusives, the French Unfair Contract Terms Commission,172 held public 
hearings to evaluate contract terms used by internet service providers in 2002.  Based on the hearings, the 
commission published an advisory detailing its findings as to which of the commonly used clauses were 
deemed as unfair under the French implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.173  The 
recommendations identified 28 clauses that the commission found to be unfair.174 
French law allows consumer groups to file representative actions – thus individual consumers are not 
required to sue.175  Consequently, when AOL failed to comply with the recommendations of the 
commission, UFC Que Choisir brought suit against AOL, claiming that terms in AOL’s standard form 
agreement violated French Unfair Contract Terms law.  Of the 36 contractual terms in dispute, the trial 
court found 31 of the terms to be either unfair or illegal.176  The Court of Appeals in Versailles affirmed 
the trial court decision in full.177 
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The positive aspect of this process for AOL was that the focus was on compliance, rather than the 
assessment and award of damages.   The court awarded €30,000 in damages and costs to UFC Que 
Choiser, €1,500 in fees to the court, and ordered AOL to bring the offending terms into compliance with 
the law under the threat of €1,000 fine per day after one month.178   It is a very small sum in comparison 
to damages commonly awarded in class action litigation in the United States, and certainly nominal in 
consideration of AOL’s operations. 
4.2.3   Better compliance and reduced litigation 
Another noteworthy aspect of the combined advisory and regulatory process is that it can generate 
compliance before the consumer is harmed and without the expense of litigation.  As an illustrative 
example, following the AOL France v UFC Que Choisir developments in France, the UK Office of Fair 
Trading (“OFT”) published guidance for compliance with distance selling and unfair contract terms 
regulations specifically geared toward IT companies.179  With the AOL France precedence showing that 
European courts will enforce such guidance for compliance, businesses have been receptive to the 
opportunity to engage in a consultative process with the OFT as a route to compliance without litigation: 
 
• Dell Corporation agreed to change terms and conditions that unfairly excluded liability, 
including for breach of contract, negligence and misrepresentation.180 
• An internet based automobile dealer agreed to provide more transparency about its terms and the 
source of its products.181 
• Dabs.com agrees “to amend unfair terms and conditions regarding returns and refunds in its 
consumer contracts.”182 
• “Online auction sites eBay, eBid, CQout, QXL and Tazbar will now include advice and links on 
their sites to inform consumers of their rights under the Distance Selling Regulations.”183 
• An online ticket retailer agreed to change its refund terms and conditions.184 
• “The operator of an online discount shopping club has agreed to revise its advertising and 
payment pages after the OFT raised concerns that consumers could be misled.”185 
• Industry group for ticket retailers agreed to fairer contract terms.186 
• Apple and iTunes stores agreed to draft contract terms “in plain or intelligible language” and to 
remove terms excluding liability for mislabelled goods and change of price after purchase.187 
 
The OFT regularly conducts ‘sweeps’ – actively investigating and consulting – of internet businesses 
and issues guidance on compliance.188  Reliance on consumer initiated legal or administrative process 
could not achieve this level of compliance as fast. 
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5. Path to global uniformity 
An economics justification – that standardization leads to reduced cost and improved efficiency – has 
been used in the United States189 to create a system that standardizes internet transactions by placing all 
of the risk on the consumer.  It is apparent that uniform regulations combined with active enforcement, as 
employed in the European Union, has also created a standard for internet transactions – although one 
where the risk is balanced away from the consumer.  While no conclusive studies are available to show 
which model better serves the balance of technological development and consumer benefit, it is apparent 
that the divergent nature of the two regulatory schemes forces internet businesses to adapt their policies to 
multiple standards.  A case can be made for moving towards a uniform global model for regulation of 
internet contracts and dispute resolution that matches the global scope and scale of the internet. 
5.1 Market and political forces affecting jurisdictional disparity 
One would be remiss to not consider the history of internet’s development, along with market forces 
affecting the desirability of reform of internet contract law, from a jurisdictional perspective.  The internet 
was developed in and grew from the United States.190  In 2005, all of the top ten parent companies on the 
internet were American companies.191  In 2009, while the top ten changed, all of them were still 
American firms.192  The audience is global. 
From the perspective of the United States, a formulistic interpretation of internet contracts that shifts 
the risks and the costs of internet transactions to the consumer is completely rational if it does not hinder 
growth of the industry.  From the perspective of the rest of the world, a strict consumer protection regime 
that shifts the risks and costs of internet transactions to where the value and profits are retained is equally 
rational.  Thus, as long as there is an imbalance between where the businesses and consumers are located, 
there will likely be resistance to any effort to create a globally uniform regime of regulation with respect 
to internet contracts.  With that in mind, should the political will develop, there are viable approaches 
towards a globally uniform regulation of internet contracts. 
5.2 Option 1: International treaty  
Most observers would agree that the internet suffers from multiplicity of jurisdictions with conflicting 
laws.193  International treaties can provide two routes towards creating global uniformity of internet 
contracts:  Through either creating specific jurisdiction or uniform legislation. 
5.2.1   Specific global jurisdiction 
Legal systems are already familiar with specific jurisdiction.  For example, criminal and civil matters are 
handled by different court systems; juvenile and family matters can also have their own systems.  It can 
be equally feasible to create a special jurisdiction for handling internet transaction disputes.194  In fact, 
the use of internet based technology to bring disputes to an internet court could provide better and cheaper 
access to both internet consumers and businesses by potentially resolving the dispute through the same 
medium that created it.  
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) is a system set up and administered 
by Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to resolve disputes about domain 
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name ownership on the internet.195  Because ICANN controls the naming system on the internet, all 
owners of internet domains are obligated to settle their disputes about their domain ownership through 
UDRP.196  It thus functions as a global jurisdiction for domain ownership disputes. 
A similar structure could be developed as a special jurisdiction for internet contract disputes.197  The 
challenge with such a development will be in funding of the organization and the issue of sovereign 
control.  Whereas UDRP is funded through domain registration fees, there is no current fee structure 
governing internet transactions to fund a special jurisdiction.  For a global internet jurisdiction to be 
funded would most likely require development of an international internet taxing scheme.  This prospect 
presents unique political and policy problems.  Moreover, the jurisdiction will need to develop its own 
rules of procedure and laws. 
5.2.2   Uniform global legislation 
The world already has a very successful model for a global code – The United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).  Ratified by 76 countries, CISG provides “a 
modern, uniform and fair regime for contracts for the international sale of goods.”198  Indeed, the 
suggestion for development of a Global Commercial Code that would govern all contract law is neither 
novel nor new.199  It can be argued that as communication and commerce becomes increasingly 
globalized, the need for a Global Commercial Code becomes more evident: “Modern means of 
communication knows no frontiers. When the world becomes one market, this market will require one 
law, and this law must include general principles of contract law.”200  
Of course, the challenge with this approach lies in the issue of sovereignty.  While nations can readily 
accept a framework such as the CISG, a global contract code would require national courts to apply a 
foreign code to govern local transactions.  While this has been shown as viable in the context of the 
European experience, it never the less presents a political threat to sovereignty. 
5.2.   Option 2: Shift from private to public law 
From the most basic point of view, the interpretation of consumer internet transactions that obsesses with 
formality and standardization of contract structure can be questioned.  We know that regardless of how 
internet contracts are formed, and how reasonable the terms may be, the consumers simply do not read 
them.201  Indeed, beyond the question of whether the words are read; research has shown that the 
presentation of boilerplate contracts, in itself, frustrates the ability to properly read and understand the 
terms of the agreement.202  Simply put, on the rare occasions when the internet contracts are actually read, 
they are often not understood by the consumer.  Thus, with boilerplate internet contracts terms, the idea of 
mutual assent is pure fiction.  This begs the question of why, as a society, we wish to place the private 
law of contract over public law and common practice. 
As Professor Lemley observed: 
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Merchants and consumers at grocery stores, restaurants, bookstores, clothing stores, and 
countless other retail outlets seem perfectly able to enter into contracts without a written 
agreement specifying their rights and obligations. Nonetheless, many of those same 
retail outlets impose standard form contracts on their online users.203 
 
We do not negotiate contracts when we walk into restaurants to order meals, nor into stores to 
purchase objects.  We could, if we preferred to, hand form contracts back and forth with the server at the 
restaurant or the clerk at the store.  However, it simply makes no sense to create a private law, by 
contract, for our transactions when local custom and public law serves just as well to fill out the terms of 
the exchange beyond those that are specifically agreed to.  Thus, when we order a meal at the restaurant 
we specifically agree on the meal item and price with the proprietor, leaving all of the non-negotiated 
terms of the ‘contract,’ such as warranties and payment terms, to public law and custom of the locality.  
Certainly, public laws and local customs can differ significantly among locations and jurisdictions, but 
there is no evidence to suggest that any difficulties they may present to a global enterprise warrants 
special legal accommodation.  For example, the fact that the consumer exchange in a restaurant is not 
bound by legal formalities of a standard contract has seemingly neither harmed globally pervasive chain 
restaurants nor limited consumer access to their products.204  Indeed, with internet commerce there is no 
evidence to suggest that the regulations of the European Union forbidding enforcement of certain contract 
terms, and the lack of standardization that these policies cause with respect to United States policies, has 
slowed development of internet technology or increased its cost to the consumer.  Yet, these real world 
observations seem to contradict the judicial assertion that standard contracts are “essential to a system of 
mass production and distribution.”205 
The economic argument put forth by ProCD and its progeny, that enforcement of standardized unread 
contract terms is essential to mass production and ultimately benefits the consumer, is flawed.  There is 
little argument that standardization of manufactured goods reduces costs to consumers.  As consumers, 
for example, we are able to better afford clothing and shoes because we buy these items ‘off the rack’ and 
in standardized sizes.  Certainly, these items would be much more expensive if we sought to obtain them 
specifically made for us from the local tailor and cobbler.206  The efficiency of standardization comes 
from economies of scale that lower the marginal cost of production.  Thus, in total, more benefit is 
available to all parties to the transaction regardless of how the benefits are distributed. 
But contracts are not a means of production;207 rather they are a means by which parties choose to 
allocate costs and benefits of their transactions.  Manufacturing and distribution economies of scale – 
whereby Google provides the services of the same computer code to all clients or McDonalds mass 
produces its fries – reduces marginal costs of production and yields a net benefit by reducing net costs to 
all parties.  Standard contracts terms that merely shift economic risk do not.  Google may arguably reduce 
its dispute resolution costs and associated liability by contract, and theoretically pass these savings to 
some consumers in terms of lower prices; but for the many consumers who could obtain a reduced cost, 
there will be a Feldman who may pay much more than he bargained for.  Such a policy choice to shift 
benefits among the parties does not create any more total benefits.  To the mathematically inclined, the 
system is zero sum.  To the realistically inclined, it lets the big concern take more benefits of the 
transaction and leave the consumers to play economic roulette for what remains.   
As such, the flaw in the ProCD rationale stems from confounding of the difference between 
manufacturing processes and contract terms.  Indeed, standardization of the former is essential to our 
systems of mass production and distribution; standardization of the latter is not.  This critical distinction is 
reflected by observations of the real world.  McDonalds operates “more than 32,000 local restaurants 
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serving more than 60 million people in 117 countries each day.”208  Obviously, standardization of their 
production methods is essential in making this possible.  Equally obvious, the 60 million customers each 
day are not required to agree to standard contract terms to obtain a Big Mac™ and fries.  Certainly, the 
laws governing standards of merchantability, restaurant liability and dispute resolution procedures must 
differ significantly among the 117 countries in which McDonalds operates.  Thus, the assertion that 
standardization of contract terms is essential to our modern system of mass production and distribution, 
and ultimately beneficial to consumers, is as much a fiction as the idea of mutual assent to such 
boilerplate terms.  While standardization of contracts may be a valid policy choice in relation to how 
benefits to certain transactions are distributed, such standardization is neither essential to modern life nor 
produces a net benefit to consumers. 
Regardless, ProCD’s rationale fails for the more important reason that it seeks to establish an unstable 
equilibrium.  Judge Easterbrook concedes that each jurisdiction has the power to forbid standard contract 
terms.209  As different jurisdictions forbid the enforcement of particular terms – which they have already 
begun to do in exercise of their powers – the purveyors of the standard contracts are robbed of the 
purported standardization.  Internet companies currently exist in a global environment where in some 
jurisdictions some of their terms are unenforceable.  Indeed, as different jurisdictions move to disallow 
different terms, the only viable standardized contract – if that is indeed the coveted goal – will be one that 
meets the most restrictive requirements of all jurisdictions.  The only stable equilibrium that can form in 
that condition is one where no boilerplate terms remain in the contract and the only private contract terms 
are those which have been specifically negotiated.   
As such, disavowing the legal fiction of the consumer’s assent to unseen and unread terms provides an 
elegant and simple solution that matches the real world observation that consumers do not read and 
understand such terms.  By that method, the terms of the contract would be determined by specifically 
negotiated terms, and local laws and custom fill the void.  One may argue that doing so may expose 
internet companies to potentially onerous conditions in some jurisdictions.  However, the internet 
business has the technical means through the Internet Protocol addressing scheme210 to know where it is 
dealing, and as such is perfectly equipped to ‘take it or leave it.’  To date, there is no evidence that 
internet companies have elected not to deal in jurisdictions that disallow their unilateral contract terms, 
nor that consumers have paid a greater price because of it.  But even if that were to occur, surely the 
economists would agree that market and competitive forces are likely better suited to adjust to the local 
anomaly and bring the benefits of the internet back to the consumers for the right price. 
5.3 Option 3: Wait for market pressure to produce conformity 
Internet businesses change and adapt their terms of service to meet market and regulatory requirements.  
Indeed, the European Union unfair contract terms law has already affected United States based internet 
businesses and led to change in their terms.211  As an example, European directives require that contract 
terms be drafted in plain language and be intelligible.212  As such, terms that are misleading or 
misunderstood can be found to be unfair and unenforceable.  The standard put forth by the UK Office of 
Fair Trading is that the consumers should be able to understand the terms without needing legal advice.  
In France, domestic legislation requires that the terms be supplied in French.213     
Internet companies follow a general approach of including all the terms that they could wish for in 
their agreements; they function with the prospect that some particular terms may not be enforceable in 
some jurisdictions.  However, the plain language rules put forth by the European Union have a unique 
effect.  If the agreement is not written in plain terms, then it is simply not enforceable, regardless of the 
substance of the terms.  The agreements needed to conform.   
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Consider for example the Facebook terms of service, available in multiple languages, for 
readability.214  Google goes further, by not only providing a ‘term of service’ written in plain language,215 
but providing a separate page that seeks to explain the terms in language that one may use with a child: 
 
We spell out those rights and responsibilities in our Terms of Service. You should read 
the Terms. Really. We also know that legal documents can be boring and that you 
might not always do what you “should.” So, we’ve tried to give you the basics here.216 
 
Thus, as internet firms seek to do business in any given forum, the mandates of that forum can help to 
create some uniformity.  Moreover, consumers can help to create uniformity in internet contracts by 
paying more attention to the terms.  Lawyers in the business of drafting internet contracts understand that 
“by the very nature of the medium, any online contract may be both a legal document and a marketing 
tool.  An agreement that contains excessive legal jargon or which is extremely one-sided may be both 
difficult to enforce and potentially raise public relations issues.”217  As such, it would seem that as the 
global market becomes more uniform, and as consumers become more informed, internet contracts may 
also move towards uniformity.   
Thus, one possible choice is to follow the path of least resistance and wait.  Given the political 
realities and the geographic imbalance of where the internet consumers and businesses are located, this 
option may be the most viable path. 
6. Conclusion 
Regulation and enforcement of internet contracts varies geographically.  Generally, there are two primary 
legal approaches to internet contract enforcement:  The United States model that relies on basic notice 
requirements to establish and enforce terms; and the European Union model that focuses on fundamental 
fairness in transactions between businesses and consumers. 
The United States model seeks to protect the internet business entities from liability, while passing on 
the risks of the transactions to the consumers.  At the same time, the United States model relies on high-
cost litigation to enforce contracts and develop the law.  As such, contractual terms are usually employed 
to reduce litigation cost and risk for the internet business, thereby maintaining the status quo. 
The European Union approach follows a social regulation model that focuses on legislation and 
regulation as a means of balancing the risks and costs of internet transactions among the participants.  
While legislation seeks to preserve the consumer’s right to legal redress, litigation is very seldom used as 
an enforcement method. 
The global reach and efficiency of scale of the internet would be best utilized in the context of a 
global regulatory and dispute resolution system; however, strong political and economic barriers to such 
an implementation are present.  As most of the Internet players are located in the United States, it is 
unlikely to accept any regulatory regime that shifts costs and risks back to its shores.  It is equally 
unlikely that the European Union would accept a move towards a United States style of internet contract 
governance.  Moreover, accepting a global code for internet contract regulation would require all 
participants to relinquish some sovereignty and control over development of their national legal system.  
The increasingly divergent philosophies and approaches of the United States and the European Union 
make bridging of the gap improbable.  Based on these parameters, the likely path to harmonization may 
be one that relies on market forces to slowly shift internet contracting norms. 
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